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On 5 October 1804, the Spanish warship Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes had almost 
completed its voyage from Peru to Spain, when it was attacked by the British fleet. In the 
ensuing battle of Cape St. Mary almost 250 Spanish sailors died.1 Historians deem the sinking 
of the Mercedes to be a pivotal event in European history. Mentioning the “sad loss of the 
frigate Mercedes”, King Carlos IV of Spain declared war against Great Britain and entered 
the Napoleonic wars on the side of France.2 
The fateful sinking of the Mercedes and its possible recovery by a commercial salvor,3 
Odyssey Marine Exploration Inc., has been the focus of a pending legal dispute. After finding 
the wreck, the salvor claimed ownership of it, under the law of finds4 or a salvage award 
under salvage law, which would entitle it to sell the recovered artefacts and receive a part of 
the revenues as compensation for the efforts made in finding and recovering the shipwreck. 
However, Spain intervened in the proceedings claiming that the Black Swan – as the salvor 
had code-named the shipwreck – was the Mercedes, and that, the Mercedes being a warship 
of the Royal Navy of Spain, it was subject to immunity from Odyssey’s claims and not 
subject to salvage against the wishes of Spain. In parallel, Peru reclaimed the treasure, which 
it deemed part of its cultural patrimony,5 while the Bolivian Government expressed its interest 
in identifying the origin of the recovered treasure.6 Finally, twenty-five descendants of those 
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 This historical account is based on Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked 
Vessel, Case No. 8:07-CV-614-SDM-MAP, Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, Judge Mark Pizzo, 3 
June 2009, p. 5 ff., and ibid., Case No. 8:07-CV-00614-SDM-MAP, Claimant Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, 22 September 2008, p. 3 ff. All the legal documents referring to this case 
and cited in this article may be found at: <http://www.justia.com>. 
2
 Claimant Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, ibid., p. 7. 
3
 “Salvor” is a nautical term which indicates a person who saves a vessel or its cargo. Salvage law 
governs salvage, which is the act of rescuing life or property from peril in water. The goal of salvage law is thus 
to provide an incentive to mariners’ solidarity. By way of analogy, admiralty courts have applied the concept of 
salvage to the recovery of ancient relics. If a private actor rescues an ancient shipwreck, thus being considered a 
salvor, he/she is entitled to a reward. The reward often consists of a generous percentage of the value of the 
saved vessel or part of the sale proceedings and auctioning of recovered artifacts. NORRIS, Benedict on 
Admiralty: The Law of Salvage, 1991, pp. 1-4. 
4
 When no owner exists or can be determined, the party who recovers the property at sea is entitled to the 
application of the law of finds. Under this doctrine, title to the abandoned property is given to the finder. While 
under salvage law, the salvor merely possesses the ship, under the law of finds, he/she is entitled to property, as 
the law of finds assumes that “the property involved was never owned or was abandoned”. See WILDER, 
“Application of Salvage Law and the Law of Finds to Sunken Shipwreck Discoveries”, Defense Counsel 
Journal, 2000, pp. 92-105, p. 93. 
5
 “[…] The Republic of Peru affirms and restates its sovereign and other rights in property that originated 
in its territory or was produced by its people […]”. See Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified 
Shipwrecked Vessel, Verified Conditional Claim of the Republic of Peru, 1 August 2008, para. 5. 
6
 See “Peru and Bolivia also Want Their Share of the Gold Found in Spanish Galleon”, MercoPress South 
Atlantic News Agency, 29 December 2009, available at: <http://en.mercopress.com/2009/12/28/peru-and-
bolivia-also-want-their-share-of-the-gold-found-in-spanish-galleon>, accessed on 15 March 2010. 
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aboard the Mercedes filed claims against the wreck. On 22 December 2009, the District Judge 
dismissed Odyssey and Peru’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and ordered 
Odyssey to return the artefacts to Spain.7 While the principles of international law upheld by 
the judge are not new, one may wonder whether customary norms of international law 
concerning the protection of sunken warships in the high seas are gradually crystallizing. 
This study shall proceed as follows. First, it will scrutinize the Black Swan case, by 
focussing on the identification of the vessel and issues of jurisdiction. Second, it shall explore 
the international legal framework which governs the recovery of sunken warships at the 
international law level. Third, issues of sovereign immunity and ownership will be addressed. 
Finally, some conclusions are put forward. 
  
 
2. THE FACTS OF THE CASE: THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE BLACK SWAN 
 
A fundamental issue that had to be dealt with by the judge in the Black Swan case was 
the identification of the vessel. Was the Black Swan the Mercedes? On the one hand, Spain 
needed to prove the identity of the vessel, in order to claim ownership and sovereign 
immunity. On the other hand, if the shipwreck was not originally a Spanish vessel, Spain 
would not have any claim on the wreck, if the wreck lay in international waters off the Straits 
of Gibraltar. As the location of the ship had not been disclosed by Odyssey, Spain suspected 
that the ship could be located in its territorial waters. 
In early 2007, Odyssey Marine announced that it had recovered over $500 million 
worth of coins from a shipwreck (or shipwrecks) at an undisclosed location. Due to alleged 
security reasons, Odyssey Marine refused to divulge information about the location or identity 
of the shipwreck (or shipwrecks), but code-named them the Black Swan.8 Instead, it brought 
three admiralty actions before the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Florida, each relating to a different contested wreck site.9 With regard to all three wrecks, 
Odyssey submitted that the Court had in personam jurisdiction over the plaintiff and 
constructive quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant shipwrecked vessel. The claimant 
presented a possessory and ownership claim pursuant to the law of finds, or, alternately, a 
salvage award claim pursuant to the law of salvage, and declaratory judgment that “no 
government has the authority to interfere with Odyssey’s exploration and/or recovery of the 
Defendant Shipwrecked Vessels […]”.10 
Suspecting that the coins might belong to its sunken ships, the Spanish Government 
moved to compel Odyssey Marine to disclose information about the locations and identities of 
the three wrecks and requested that all three cases be transferred to the same court. The 
District Court granted the motion, requiring Odyssey Marine to disclose any relevant 
information to Spain. Upon this disclosure, the Court determined that one of the vessels – the 
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 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:07-cv-614-T-
23MAP, Order of the District Judge, 22 December 2009. 
8
 Odyssey Marine Exploration named the project Black Swan after a book by a financial analyst, Nassim 
Taleb. According to Taleb, the “black swan” concept refers to high-impact unexpected events. 
9
 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:06-CV-16854-
T23-TBM, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, 13 September 2006; Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., v. 
The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:07-CV-00616-JSM-MSS, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in 
Rem, 9 April 2007; Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:07-
cv-00614-SCB-MAP, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, 9 April 2007. 
10
 Case No. 8:07-cv-00614-SCB-MAP, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, ibid., para. 28; Case No. 
8:07-cv-00616-JSM-MSS, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, ibid., para. 29; Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:06-cv-01685-SDM-TBM, Verified 
Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, 13 September 2006, para. 33. 
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one located between Sardinia and Sicily in the Mediterranean Sea11 – was the SS Ancona, an 
Italian vessel that sank in 1915.12 The other vessel lying “beyond the territorial waters or 
contiguous zone of any sovereign nation, approximately 40 miles from Land’s End near the 
English Channel” was believed to be an English 17th century merchant ship.13 The name 
released to the media was the Merchant Royal.14 Therefore, as these ships were not Spanish, 
Spain voluntarily dismissed its claims to these wrecks.15 However, it retained interest in the 
third shipwreck located beyond the territorial waters or contiguous zone of any sovereign 
nation, approximately 100 miles west of the Straits of Gibraltar.16 
According to Odyssey, the identity of the vessel could not be ascertained, because there 
was no shipwreck.17 When Odyssey found piles of coins on the ocean floor, it was not clear 
whether the relicts belonged to the Mercedes or to other vessels. The coins were found in an 
area known to be a historical maritime route. According to the company, no less than thirty 
vessels, including the Mercedes, lie in this area. The company thus contended that “there 
[wa]s no definitive archaeological evidence and all evidence […] remain[ed] 
circumstantial”.18 
By contrast, according to Spain, Odyssey knew but chose not to reveal the identity of 
the wreck. Not only had Odyssey conducted extensive research on the history of the wreck in 
order to locate it,19 but – immediately after filing the complaint – Odyssey dispatched a 
chartered aircraft from Gibraltar resulting in 203 gold coins, 10,080 silver coins, copper ingot 
and military artefacts being taken from the site.20 A second aircraft chartered by Odyssey 
brought more than 500,000 additional coins and other artefacts to Florida.21 Spain argued that 
the photographs and video of the site showed the remains of the Mercedes “in precisely the 
condition to be expected of a wooden-hulled warship that exploded and sank two centuries 
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 Case No. 8:07-cv-00616-JSM-MSS, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, ibid. 
12
 The Ancona, an Italian-American liner, sank on 6 November 1915 in international waters south of the 
Sardinian coast. From a historical perspective, its recovery sheds light on a dark corner of WWI, as the Ancona, 
which had been making frequent trips between Naples and New York since 1908, was carrying no guns or 
munitions, as on board were mostly Italian emigrant when it was shelled by a German U-boat: 159 civilians 
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Government which had secretly acquired arms from the US to fight Austria. On 9 April 2007, Odyssey filed a 
warrant of arrest in rem establishing a “maritime lien” on the shipwreck (Case No. 8:07-cv-00616 (M.D. Fla.)). 
On 6 January 2010, the Tampa Tribunal did not ascertain the ownership of the vessel, but held that neither the 
salvagers nor the Italian Government could take any initiative without first giving 45 days’ notice to the other 
party. See HOOPER, “Courts Curb Bounty Hunters Seeking Torpedoed Liner’s £ 15m Bullion”, The Guardian, 
12 January 2010; “Nuova pagina da Tampa sul giallo dell’Ancona”, La Stampa, 18 February 2010. 
13
 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. the Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, Case No. 8:06-cv-
1685-T-23MAP, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, 13 September 2006, and Odyssey Marine 
Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, Case No. 8:06-cv-1685-T-23MAP, Report 
and Recommendation, 5 January 2010. 
14
 The Merchant Royal was carrying silver, gold and jewels from Mexico to London when it sank in bad 
weather near the isles of Scilly in 1641. See LEONARD, “Hoard of Treasure ‘Found on Wreck Off Cornwall’”, 
The Telegraph, 19 May 2007; “Record Wreck ‘Found off Cornwall’”, BBC News, 19 May 2007, available at: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/england/cornwall/6671975.stm>. 
15
 Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:07-cv-616-T-
23MAP, Order, 4 April 2008. 
16
 Case No. 8:07-cv-00614-SCB-MAP, Verified Complaint in Admiralty in Rem, cit. supra note 9, p. 2. 
17
 “No ship existed. No hull. No keel. No intact structure suggesting the presence of a vessel”. See 
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, Case No. 8:07-CV-00614-SDM-
MAP, Plaintiff, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc.’s Response to Claimant, Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, 17 November 2008, p. 6. 
18
 Ibid., p. 7. 
19
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ago”.22 Furthermore, the recovered coins were struck in South America, mainly in Lima, Peru. 
A fact consistent with the historical data that the Mercedes stopped in El Callao, the port of 
Lima. According to Spain, as the shipwreck is the Nuestra Señora de las Mercedes, it belongs 
to Spain’s historical patrimony and constitutes the gravesite of Spanish servicemen. 23 
Furthermore, already in 2004, Spain officially notified the US Department of State that its 
sunken ships could not be disturbed without authorization. 24  When Odyssey expressly 
requested Spain’s consent to recover and sell artefacts from shipwrecks of historical and 
cultural interest to Spain, such authorization was denied.25 
The Magistrate’s Report concluded that the wreck was the Mercedes.26 The report found 
that overwhelming circumstantial evidence 27  – location, coins, cannons and artefacts – 
pointed to the Mercedes. First, the wreck lied within the likeliest zone of the Mercedes’ 
sinking. Second, the recovered coins “dat[ed] from the latter half of the 18th century to no 
later than 1804; [were] all of Spanish nationality; and [were] minted almost exclusively in the 
‘South American Spanish Crown Colonies’ and the mint in Lima in particular”.28 The salvor 
argued that the coins could come from another vessel because Spanish coins were acceptable 
currency throughout the commercial world. This argument, however, was deemed to be 
unpersuasive.29 Third, not only did “the 17 cannons found at the site match the type the 
Mercedes would have carried”, but the site included two culverins that historic data confirm 
the Mercedes was carrying when it sank. 30  Fourth, according to historical records, the 
Mercedes carried large quantities of copper and tin ingots when it sank and “the site includes 
large quantities of copper and tin ingots”.31 Finally, “some of the debris and artefacts show 
evidence of a violent explosion”.32  The District Judge agreed with the Magistrate Judge, 
stating: 
 
“The ineffable truth of this case is that the Mercedes is a naval vessel of Spain and 
that the wreck of this naval vessel, the vessel’s cargo, and any human remains are 
the natural and legal patrimony of Spain and are entitled in good conscience and 
in law to lay undisturbed in perpetuity absent the consent of Spain and despite any 
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26
 Case No. 8:07-CV-614-SDM-MAP, Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, cit. supra note 1, p. 12. 
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After having determined the identity of the vessel, the District Judge had to ascertain his 
competence to settle the dispute. Admiralty courts are ordinary courts exercising jurisdiction 
and hearing disputes under the rules and procedures of admiralty law. In the United States, the 
Constitution submits maritime cases to federal courts which may sit as admiralty courts.34 
However, since the wreck of the Mercedes lay in international waters and was a Spanish 
vessel, the question to be addressed was whether admiralty courts could exercise jurisdiction 
over shipwrecks belonging to sovereigns found in the high seas. As one author points out, 
“this appears to be an impermissible extension of prescriptive jurisdiction or even US 
sovereignty beyond national borders, and it is unclear why or how any third party could be 
bound by the courts’ rulings”. 35  Can national courts act as “surrogates for dormant 
transnational authority”?36 Can national courts fill adjudicative gaps at the international level? 
The Magistrate’s Report, fully endorsed by the subsequent Order of the District Judge,37 
recommended that all the claims against the shipwreck be denied, and Odyssey be directed to 
return the recovered artifacts to Spain. The Magistrate Judge and the District Judge upheld 
Spain’s argument that the Court was without subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).38  According to the FSIA and consistent case law, “a 
foreign state, or its property, is presumptively immune from the jurisdiction of the United 
States courts; unless a specified exception applies, a federal court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction”.39 As the Mercedes belonged to Spain, the Magistrate argued, it was immune 
from suit, unless Odyssey showed that an exception applied.40 In this sense, Odyssey claimed 
that not all the cargo aboard the Mercedes was sovereign property, and that, accordingly, the 
Court should split the cargo from the vessel and then, to vindicate the individual claimants, 
split the cargo into separate private lots. The Magistrate, however, held that such an approach 
would have departed from traditional admiralty practice which deems a vessel and its cargo to 
be inextricably intertwined.41 Furthermore, Spain’s sovereign vessels are covered by the 1902 
Treaty of Friendship and General Relations between the United Nations and Spain, which 
states that “[i]n cases of shipwreck […] each party shall afford to the vessels of the other, 
whether belonging to the State or to individuals, the same assistance and protection and the 
same immunities which would have been granted to its own vessels in similar cases”.42 In 
order to critically assess the Magistrate’s Report and the subsequent order of the District 
Judge, the following section will contextualize them exploring the legal framework which 
governs sunken military vessels at the international law level. 
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 United States Constitution, Article 3, Section 2: “The judicial power [of the United States] shall extend 
[…] to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction […]”. As an author explains, “the Founding Fathers were 
interested in having a uniform federal judiciary system for maritime cases in order to enhance maritime trade and 
commerce”. BRADLEY, “The Supreme Court and Maritime Jurisdiction”, Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 2000-
2001, p. 207 ff., p. 207. 
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 WRIGHT, “Keepers, Weepers, or No Finders at All: The Effect of International Trends on the Exercise 
of U.S. Jurisdiction and Substantive Law in the Salvage of Historic Wrecks”, Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 
2008-2009, p. 297 ff. 
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 NAFZIGER, “The Evolving Role of Admiralty Courts in Litigation Related to Historic Wreck”, Harvard 
International Law Journal, 2003, p. 251 ff. 
37
 Case No. 8:07-cv-614-T-23MAP, Order, 22 December 2009, cit. supra note 7. 
38
 28 USC § 1602 ff. 
39
 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 US 349, 355 (1993); 28 USC paras. 1604 and 1609, cited in Case No. 
8:07-CV-614-SDM-MAP, Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation, cit. supra note 1, p. 16. 
40
 Ibid., p. 16. 
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 Ibid., p. 23. See Sunken Military Craft Act (Publ. L. No. 108-375, para. 1406 ff., 118 Stat. 2094 (28 
October 2004)) para. 1408(1). 
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4. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF SUNKEN MILITARY VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In cases involving military vessels, strong political and diplomatic motives discourage 
the application of the law of finds and salvage law.43 In addition to deserving treatment as 
gravesites, sunken military vessels may contain objects of national security or of 
archaeological or historical nature. They may also contain dangerous artifacts that could pose 
danger to human health and the maritime environment. At the international level, a regime 
complex regulates public vessels. This patchwork of norms seems to coalesce and create a 
special status for sunken public vessels. While various provisions partially overlap, they 
pursue different objectives. This section attempts to scrutinize and critically assess the 
existing legal framework. 
Military vessels and public vessels are regulated by the law of the sea. The Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas (CHS) provides that “[w]arships on the high seas have complete 
immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State”.44 It also provides that 
“Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial service 
shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than 
the flag State”.45 Although “the importance of the Geneva Convention [on the High Seas] is 
currently mostly historical, as an expression of the ‘traditional law of the sea’”,46 it is worth 
highlighting that many of its provisions, at the time of its adoption corresponded to customary 
international law. As Professor Treves points out, “this seems particularly true as regards the 
CHS, most of which has been transported into the 1982 Convention, and whose preamble 
explicitly specifies that its purpose is ‘to codify the rules of international law relating to the 
high seas’”.47 In addition, the CHS remains binding and applicable to or between the few 
States that are parties to it and not parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), 48  including the United States. 49  Indeed, the same provisions concerning 
warships and public vessels are repeated verbatim in the UNCLOS.50 Many articles of the 
UNCLOS are considered customary international law. 
These norms are confirmed by customary norms of international law concerning State 
immunity, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of 
States and Their Property51 and the International Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules concerning the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels52 and its 1934 Additional Protocol.53 
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 If one adopts a systematic interpretation scrutinizing other international law instruments, it appears that 
the International Convention on Salvage (28 April 1989, 1953 UNTS 194) does not apply to warships and non-
commercial State-owned vessels. See Article 5. 
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 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 82. See Article 8. 
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 Article 9. 
46 TREVES, “1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea”, available at: 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html> accessed on 23 March 2010, p. 3. 
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the UNCLOS, Article 311 UNCLOS states that the UNCLOS “shall prevail, as between State parties over the 
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958”. 
49
 The United States signed the UNCLOS, but has not yet ratified it. 
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 See Articles 95 and 96.  
51
 Although the Convention has not yet entered into force, it is deemed to reflect customary law. The 
Convention favors the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. Accordingly, States are not immune in respect of 
a commercial transaction (Article 10). Article 21 of the Convention sets forth categories of property that shall be 
considered as property intended for government, non-commercial purposes by the State. These categories 
include, inter alia, military property and property forming part of the cultural heritage or scientific interest of the 
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With regard to sunken military vessels, the question is whether these norms remain 
applicable. On the one hand, if one interprets these legal conventions literally, there is no 
provision neither in the CHS nor in the UNCLOS dealing with sunken public vessels. It has 
been argued that “‘a ship is born when she is launched, and lives so long as her identity is 
preserved’. Therefore, when a ship sinks and her identity is lost to the ravages of the sea, she 
is no longer a vessel”.54 During the travaux préparatoires of the third conference on the law 
of the sea, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries proposed to recognize absolute 
sovereign immunity to sunken military vessels, alleging the existence of a customary norm of 
international law on the matter.55 However the proposal was not accepted. 
On the other hand, the very concept of property is not limited in time, but tends to 
perpetuity. Maritime powers have expressed their concerns relating to sunken warships.56 For 
instance, in this regard, Spain stated: 
 
“In accordance with Spanish and international law, Spain has not abandoned or 
otherwise relinquished its ownership or other interests with respect to […] 
[sunken vessels that were lost while in the service of the Kingdom of Spain and/or 
were transporting property of the Kingdom of Spain] and/or its contents, except 
by specific action pertaining to particular vessels or property taken by Royal 
Decree or Act of Parliament in accordance with Spanish law” (emphasis added).57 
 
At the governmental level, a former president of the US similarly stated: 
 
“Pursuant to the property clause of Article IV of the Constitution, the United 
States retains title indefinitely to its sunken State craft unless title has been 
abandoned or transferred in a manner Congress authorized or directed. The United 
States recognizes the rule of international law that title to foreign sunken State 
craft may be transferred or abandoned only in accordance with the law of the 
foreign flag State. Further, the United States recognizes that title to a United 
States or foreign sunken State craft, wherever located, is not extinguished by 
passage of time, regardless of when such sunken State craft was lost at sea” 
(emphasis added).58 
 
Other States have similarly held that “[u]nder international law of the sea all the sunken 
warships and government aircraft remain the property of their flag State”.59 
Several admiralty cases have confirmed this opinion. In Hatteras, which concerned a 
Civil War vessel, the United States successfully argued that it retained title over the vessel, 
                                                                                                                                                        
State. Article 16(2) expressly refers to warships. For commentary, see FOX, “In Defence of State Immunity: Why 
the UN Convention on State Immunity Is Important”, ICLQ, 2006, pp. 399-406. 
52
 10 April 1926, 176 LNTS 199. See Article 3. 
53
 24 May 1934, 176 LNTS 215. See Article 1. 
54
 WALKER, “A Contemporary Standard for Determining Title to Sunken Warships: A Tale of Two 
Vessels and Two Nations”, University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal, 1999-2000, pp. 311-358, p. 350, 
citing Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 US 424, 438 (1902). 
55
 See BEURIER, “Pour un droit international de l’archéologie sous-marine”, RGDIP, 1989, pp. 45-68, p. 
60. 
56
 See US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, cit. supra note 24. 
57
 “Many such vessels also are the resting place of military and/or civilian casualties”. Communication 
from the Embassy of Spain, Note 128, 19 December 2002, see ibid., p. 5647. 
58
 CLINTON, “Statement on United States Policy for the Protection of Sunken Warships”, Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents 195, 22 January 2001. 
59See Communication from the Government of the Russian Federation to the US State Department, 3 
October 2003, in US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, OFFICE OF OCEAN AFFAIRS, cit. supra note 24. 
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notwithstanding a contrary statement by the Secretary of Navy, who was deemed to have 
acted ultra vires.60 In the Sea Hunt case, concerning the Juno and La Galga, two Spanish 
warships that sank in the 18th century off the coast of Virginia, the District Court held that 
Spain had abandoned La Galga under a 1763 treaty ending the Seven Years War, but it had 
not expressly abandoned Juno.61 In 2000, the Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the District Court with regard to La Galga, on the grounds that in the treaty Spain did not 
expressly abandon its properties at sea.62 The Court of Appeals also made reference to a note 
of the US Department of State which declared that “the doctrine of express abandonment is 
consistent with the customary norm of international law that title to sunken warships may be 
abandoned only by express act of abandonment”.63 As Spain refused salvage, stating that it 
had no intention to rescue the ships, Sea Hunt was not entitled to a salvage award.64 The 
Court also confirmed the Spanish sovereign claims to the two vessels, making reference to 
general principles of international comity.65 As the Court expressly stated, “the protection of 
the sacred sites of other nations thus assists in preventing the disturbance of our own”.66 Sea 
Hunt petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court, but certiorari was denied. 
Even international agreements among maritime countries seem to be based on the title 
of property. For instance, in the US-France Agreement Regarding the Sunken Vessel La 
Belle, the US Government acknowledged France’s title to the wreck and France formally 
asserted ownership.67  In the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of 
Great Britain and Canada Pertaining to the Shipwrecks HMS Erebus and HMS Terror,68 the 
States made reference to the principle of sovereign immunity and/or ownership.69  In the 
Agreement between the Netherlands and Australia concerning Dutch Old Shipwrecks, the 
parties did not make reference to sovereign immunity but to State property.70  A similar 
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 Hatteras Inc. v. The U.S.S. Hatteras, 1984 AMC 1094, pp. 1101-1102. 
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2000). 
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 Ibid., para. 13. 
64
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cit. supra note 54, pp. 314-320. 
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exchange of notes between Italy and the UK solved the dispute relating to the H.M.S. Spartan, 
a British vessel sunk in Anzio in 1944.71 
It is debatable whether the special status of sunken military shipwrecks depends on 
sovereign immunity. 72 In the seminal Schooner Exchange case, which concerned the claim of 
US citizens to a ship that had been unlawfully requisitioned by the Napoleon Army and then 
used as a French warship, Chief Justice Marshall of the US Supreme Court stated: “[a 
warship] constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate and 
direct command of the sovereign […] the interference [of a foreign State] cannot take place 
without affecting [the sovereign’s] power and […] dignity”.73  The decision was that US 
courts had no jurisdiction over a military vessel in the service of a sovereign of another 
country.74 The case, however, concerned a military vessel, not a sunken one. In United States 
v. Steinmetz, the Third Circuit held that “warships are to be treated uniquely” and concluded 
that “warships and their remains are […] clothed with sovereign immunity and therefore 
entitled to a presumption against abandonment of title” (emphasis added).75 At the heart of the 
case was the bell from the C.S.S. Alabama, a Confederate warship sunk during the American 
Civil War. Steinmetz, a collector of antiquities, had purchased the bell in London and tried to 
sell it to the US in the 1970s. Instead of buying the bell, the United States claimed title to it, 
contending that the Alabama and its content still belonged to the US. The Court held that the 
bell belonged to the United States.76 In the Black Swan case, Spain successfully argued that  
 
“The fact that a warship has sunk has no effect on its protected status under 
international law. The United States, Spain, and other sea-going nations recognize 
the rule that the site of a sunken warship may not be disturbed without the express 
permission of the warship’s sovereign owner”.77 
 
Although sovereign immunity claims have been accepted by courts even with regard to 
sunken military vessels, it is worth scrutinizing the merit of such an approach.78 
Under international law, sovereign immunity indicates that States are immune from 
legal proceedings in another State. Sovereign immunity stems from customary international 
law and is based on “the perfect equality and absolute interdependence of sovereigns”.79 The 
rule par in parem non habet imperium expresses the idea that one sovereign State does not 
have authority over another sovereign State. 80  Judges have also recognized the political 
significance of sovereign immunity, as “giving full effect to sovereign immunity promotes the 
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comity that has contributed to the development of the [sovereign] immunity doctrine”.81 The 
principle of international comity requires every sovereign State to respect the independence 
and dignity of every other sovereign State and not to exercise jurisdiction over the property of 
any State which is destined to public use. 
Some authors have criticized the extension of absolute immunity to sunken military 
vessels, highlighting the functional aspect of the notion of warship.82 These authors admit that 
military activities constitute activities jure imperii and deserve absolute immunity. They note, 
however, that after the sinking, the warship would lose its function as a State organ.83 As the 
commander and the crew constitute “des elements constitutifs du navire de guerre, leur perte 
entraîne un changement de la nature de l’object”.84 Vierucci has articulated this critique as 
follows: 
 
“la fonction de caractère politico-militaire que le navire doit assumer en tant 
qu’organe d’Etat conçu principalement pour le combat est sans doute inhérente à 
la destination du bien. Le naufrage entraîne la perte de l’identité structurelle du 
navire et de son aptitude potentielle à la navigation qui représente l’élément 
essentiel de la destinatio ad navigandum; la destination du bien subit dès lors elle 
aussi, à la suite du naufrage, une modification inévitable qui empêche le 
déroulement des fonctions gouvernementales originairement attribuées au navire” 
[internal citations omitted].85 
 
According to Vierucci, only if the shipwreck contained documents and/or instruments 
of a military character should immunity be recognized.86 
From a theoretical perspective, this argument holds true. The reason why sovereign 
immunity is recognized to warships is due to their specific function. When this specific 
function ceases to exist, the shipwreck is no longer a warship but a wreck. From a policy 
perspective, however, one may wonder whether the sinking alone may change the quality of 
the warship and its public nature. Besides issues of property, other policy concerns arise. 
First, these shipwrecks should be considered as maritime graves. Maritime war graves should 
be treated in the same fashion as land based war graves. Customary international 
humanitarian law requires States to care for and preserve war graves.87 The Second Geneva 
Convention88 also prohibits pillage.89 Second, political reasons and issues of reciprocity have 
moved States to extend the concept of immunity to sunken military vessels. This opinio juris 
seems supported by recent qualified practice. Third, warships may also hold an important 
cultural value. The public policy of protecting and preserving historical and cultural objects is 
a common concern of mankind. 
From a cultural heritage perspective, the UNCLOS recognizes the obligation of States 
to protect archaeological and historical objects.90 Under UNCLOS Article 303, States have 
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the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and shall co-
operate for this purpose.91 In parallel, Article 149 states that all objects of an archaeological 
and historical nature found on the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction (the so-called Area) “shall be preserved and disposed of for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State or 
country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeological 
origin”. Not only do the two provisions not define what constitutes an archaeological and 
historical object, but they also fail to mention the measures to be taken to protect such objects. 
Also, there seems to be an intrinsic ambiguity in the regime established by the Convention. 
Authors have highlighted that while the incipit of Article 149 seems to give preference to an 
internationalist conception of underwater cultural heritage (“[archaeological objects] shall be 
preserved and disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole”) the remaining part of the 
provision seems to adopt a nationalist view of cultural objects (“particular regard being paid 
to the preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the 
State of historical and archaeological origin”).92 Thus, the Convention expressly left room for 
the elaboration of a more detailed protection regime by a specific international instrument.93 
A more specific instrument for the international protection of underwater cultural 
heritage is the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural 
Heritage (CPUCH).94 The elaboration of the Convention reflects the increasing awareness 
reached within the international community of the importance of protecting underwater 
cultural heritage.95 The Convention defines underwater cultural heritage as 
 
“all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological 
character which have been partially or totally under water, periodically or 
continuously, for at least 100 years such as […] (b) vessels, aircraft, other vehicles 
or any part thereof, their cargo or other contents, together with their 
archaeological and natural context […]”. 
 
While this definition seems extremely broad, it concretely restricts the notion of cultural 
heritage to a certain timeframe. The 100-year cut-off point has been criticized as warships 
from the two world wars are excluded, notwithstanding their significant historical and cultural 
value.96 
With regard to the recovery of warships and public vessels, several provisions are of 
interest. First, the CPUCH has to be interpreted and applied “in the context of and in a manner 
consistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
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Sea”.97 More specifically, “[…] nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as modifying 
the rules of international law and State practice pertaining to sovereign immunities nor any 
State’s rights with respect to its State vessels and aircraft”.98 Second, it provides that “[n]o 
State Party shall undertake or authorize activities directed at State vessels and aircraft in the 
Area without the consent of the flag State”.99 The CPUCH also prohibits any intervention on 
these wrecks in the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf without the 
authorization of the flag State.100 By contrast, in the territorial sea, the coastal State may 
regulate and/or authorize interventions on military sunken vessels “in the exercise of State 
sovereignty and the general practice among States” (emphasis added). 101  However, the 
coastal State “should inform the flag State party to this Convention and, if applicable, other 
States with a verifiable link, especially a cultural, historical or archaeological link, with 
respect to the discovery of such identifiable state vessels […]” (emphasis added).102 This last 
provision was opposed by maritime powers,103 which favored a rule requiring the consent of 
the flag State even in the territorial waters of another country. For instance, the UK Foreign 
Office explained the UK’s abstention from voting on the final text of the Convention: 
 
“The United Kingdom considers that the current text erodes the fundamental 
principles of customary international law, codified in [the UNCLOS], of 
sovereign immunity which is retained by a State’s warships and vessels and 
aircraft used for non commercial service until expressly abandoned by that State” 
(emphasis added).104 
 
This perspective seems to be confirmed by qualified practice.105  State practice and 
opinio juris are the constitutive elements of customary international law. However, whether a 
custom in this sense exists is still debated. For instance, Bedermann stated that “there is 
simply no rule of customary international law – today or in the past – that requires sunken 
warships to be expressly or affirmatively abandoned by their original sovereign owners”.106 In 
a subsequent article, however, Bedermann admits that the phenomenon of instant custom is a 
remarkable feature of the modern law of the sea, and that the extension of sovereign 
immunities to sunken warships may become customary international law.107 Other authors 
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deem that such a customary norm of international law already exists.108 It seems that a norm 
of customary international law is gradually coalescing in this area. 
 
 
5. WHO OWNS UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE? 
 
The dilemma which underlies many disputes concerning cultural goods is whether these 
goods should be returned to the original owners who produced them, or whether the actual 
possessors should be privileged simply because of possession. In many circumstances, 
dramatic historical events characterize the history of certain cultural objects. What should be 
done with the recovered artifacts? Should the finders be keepers and the losers weepers? 
Would this solution not be simplistic and unfair with regard to the people who perished 
because of dramatic circumstances? If the finders were not compensated for their efforts, who 
would attempt to locate and recover shipwrecks? What about the danger of dispersing the 
memory of these historical events? 
The increasing capability to reach undersea archaeological treasures has intensified the 
debate on related ownership and management issues. While the scientific community and the 
public at large demand the preservation of cultural heritage, commercial salvors who have 
been particularly successful in maritime excavation have recovered costs by claiming 
possession rights under salvage law and selling artifacts. In the current legal framework, 
salvage law contemplates monetary rewards and incentives for salvaging shipwrecks. 
However, salvage involves dilution and irremediable loss of cultural heritage.109 According to 
what may be called the purist view,110 commercial salvage operators are contemporary pirates 
and should be excluded from working on historical wreck sites.111 
Still, unless salvors can recover underwater heritage, it is unlikely that this heritage will 
ever be brought to light.112 Not only are most countries short of funding for such works; at the 
same time they face a lack of expertise, equipment and historical documents. Even 
industrialized countries may find it difficult to invest huge monetary resources in rescuing 
underwater cultural heritage. While certain shipwrecks have been found accidentally and/or 
have been excavated by maritime archaeologists through public funding, this is rarely the 
case. These different positions on the appropriate legal framework to deal with underwater 
cultural heritage are based on different theoretical assumptions. On the one hand, the 
mercantilist approach aims to reward the work of salvors. On the other hand, the purist 
approach is based on the conception of cultural objects as the common heritage of mankind. 
In dealing with the clash of these conflicting interests and philosophies, courts have struggled 
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to settle cultural heritage disputes. Given the international dimension of most of the disputes, 
underwater cultural heritage has become the last frontier of the international legal debate.113 
With regard to the ownership of undersea heritage, neither UNCLOS nor the CPUCH 
govern property rights. Article 149 of the UNCLOS states that all objects of an archaeological 
and historical nature found on the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction (the so-called Area) “shall be preserved and disposed of for the benefit of 
mankind as a whole […]”. Underwater cultural heritage may be considered as an “integral 
part of the common heritage of humanity” because of its universal importance. 114  The 
common heritage of mankind “symbolizes the unity of mankind” and “belongs” to all 
peoples. However, this formulation does not establish a form of collective property rights or a 
“distinct international cultural heritage”,115 but affirms the objective of protecting underwater 
cultural heritage.116 
Article 149 of the UNCLOS also requires that “particular regard” be paid to “the 
preferential rights of the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State 
of historical and archaeological origin”. As Strati clarified, this vague formulation indicates 
that particular attention has to be paid to the cultural linkages of a given object to the 
communities which originated it. 117  Cultural heritage is always associated with a given 
civilization:118 “historically and socially, it is related to a particular human group, whether a 
whole nation or a minority group within it”.119 However, Article 149 of the UNCLOS does 
not clarify which community should be preferred. Underwater cultural heritage is 
multicultural heritage par excellence because of its cosmopolitan character. It may be relevant 
to the State of origin of the ship, the State of origin of the cargo, the coastal State on whose 
continental shelf the wreck was found and to other third States. As Strati suggested, perhaps 
the best approach is to adopt a case-by-case approach.120 
In the case of “difficult heritage”, i.e. heritage that recalls dramatic events,121 such as 
looting of religious goods and other riches in time of war, genocide and so on, the case for 
restitution becomes compelling.122 In these specific circumstances, equity infra legem requires 
the interpretation of Article 149 of the UNCLOS so as to allow restitution and to right 
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historical wrongs.123 Human dignity requires that adequate consideration be paid to human 
remains. Religious and cultural objects stolen during operations of ethnic cleansing must be 
returned to the relevant cultural communities.124 
In the Black Swan case, Peru contended that the cultural, historical and archaeological 
connection was “the crucial linkage for recognizing sovereign State interests”. 125  In 
particular, Peru argued that its right to the cargo of the Mercedes was superior to Spain’s 
“since the property physically, culturally and historically originated in Peru”, 126  being 
“extracted from Peruvian territory by […][the forced labour of] Peruvians”.127 Peru also asked 
the Court to “apply general admiralty principles within the broader context of contemporary 
international law”,128 and referred to different sets of norms based upon the law of the sea, the 
law of State succession, and considerations of equity and international policy concerning 
“condemnation of colonialism, protection of permanent sovereignty over national wealth and 
resources, the protection of cultural heritage and the prohibition against pillage of occupied 
countries”.129 First, Peru claimed that the Court should apply the rule set forth in Article 149 
of the UNCLOS, which grants preferential rights to the State of origin.130 As mentioned 
above, Article 149 UNCLOS states that “particular regard” should be paid “to the preferential 
rights of the State or country of origin or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical 
and archaeological origin”. Second, Peru claimed that “modern international law on the rights 
and duties of successor States would grant Peru at least an equitable proportion of the 
treasure”, 131  deeming that when a nation is divided, all successor States are entitled to 
equitable shares of the State property, with preference given to the historical and 
archaeological origin. Third, Peru argued that the Court should apply principles of equity to 
divide the property.132 According to Peru, not only have admiralty courts applied principles of 
equity, but international law itself incorporates such principles. One of these principles – 
unjust enrichment – “advances the justice-based proposition that one party should not unfairly 
enrich itself at the expense of another”.133 
In its reply, Spain acknowledged that Peru declared its independence in 1821 and that, 
after the defeat of the Spanish forces in the Battle of Ayacucho, Spain surrendered its territory 
and its objects within that territory. However, Spain pointed out that the Capitulation of 
Ayacucho did not provide surrender or abandonment of Spanish warships and merchant ships. 
On the contrary, ships were given time “to make themselves fit and leave for the Pacific 
Ocean”.134 Spain formally recognized Peru’s independence in 1879 by ratifying a peace and 
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friendship treaty which established “a solid and inviolable peace between the Republic of 
Peru and His Majesty the King of Spain”.135 
Furthermore, Spain contended that Peru has no claim under Article 149 of UNCLOS. 
First, Article 149 – Spain argued – was inapplicable because Spain, not Peru, was the State or 
country of origin: “when the Mercedes sailed from El Callao, everything placed on board 
there ‘originated’ in what was part of Spain”.136  Second, Spain claimed that Article 149 
concerns only objects found in the Area, that is, the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Peru acknowledged that the Mercedes was 
not found in the Area. Therefore, Spain argued that Article 149 is inapplicable.137 Third, 
Spain relied on Article 95 of UNCLOS which provides for sovereign immunity of warships. 
Fourth, Spain highlighted that Peru has neither signed nor ratified UNCLOS. Even if Peru 
was a party to UNCLOS, Spain claimed that under Article 286 of UNCLOS, any dispute 
concerning its interpretation or application should be brought before the International 
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice or a special tribunal 
constituted in accordance with other parts of the Convention.138 Therefore, “a US court [wa]s 
not the proper forum for Peru’s UNCLOS-dependent theories”.139 
Spain also opposed Peru’s claim under international State succession principles, 
claiming that Peru was seeking to raise a non-justiciable political question.140 First, the 1983 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of State Property is not in force. In the 
twenty-five years since it was drafted, it has been ratified by only seven States. Moreover, the 
Convention was met with widespread opposition, and cannot be considered to be accepted by 
the international community as a whole.141 Even if the Convention was applicable, by its 
terms the Convention applies only in respect of the succession of States which has occurred 
after its entry into force.142 Finally, it would apply unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
Spain claimed that any cession was governed by the Capitulation of Ayacucho.143 
The Magistrate deemed Peru’s requests as “inconsistent”: “on one hand, Peru agreed 
that Spain was immune from Odyssey’s salvage claims […]; but on the other, it maintained 
that Spain was not immune from Peru’s claim against the res”.144 Instead, the Magistrate 
deemed that the jurisdictional nexus over the shipwreck was too tenuous to settle the dispute 
between two sovereigns over the remnants of a sunken warship.145 He held that “Peru and 
Spain’s dispute is intertwined with centuries of mutual history. Addressing their differences in 
this forum […] would undermine the traditional notions of international comity […]” and 
constitute an “unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction”.146 In sum, the Magistrate concluded that 
“Spain and Peru’s dispute over the specie is best resolved through direct negotiations between 
the two and not in this forum”.147 The District Judge agreed with the Magistrate that the 
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principles articulated by [Peru] “may govern in another forum on another day in resolving 





Shipwrecks are an invaluable source of knowledge and hold a profound historic and 
cultural value. 149  From a historical perspective, the discovered goods may constitute a 
“difficult heritage” because they recall dramatic events of the past and stories of aggression 
and violence. Still, they offer us the possibility of remembering the dead and unveiling often 
neglected episodes of the past. From a cultural perspective, underwater cultural heritage 
represents an “integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity and a particularly important 
element in the history of peoples and their relations with each other concerning their common 
heritage”.150 As a Hamilton once put it, “[maritime disputes] so generally depend on the laws 
of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, they fall within the considerations 
which are relative to the public peace”.151 
The Black Swan case is a dispute which combines: “a compelling episode in naval 
history”, the law of the sea, “the intriguing prospect of recovering great wealth lost in 
connection with an international conflict, the objective of respectful […] preservation of 
warships […] lost at sea, and the troubling question of the plight of both persons and natural 
resources subject to colonial exploitation”.152 Several legal and political issues are raised by 
the case. First, it seems to reaffirm that “at least in the context of historic salvage, general 
maritime law only operates within the parameters of public international law and relies on 
national courts to apply it in an internationally sensitive manner”.153 Second, it restates a 
distinction between private property and public property which is found in maritime powers’ 
policy statements, national legislation,154 and even international law instruments. One may 
question, however, whether such a distinction makes sense with regard to underwater cultural 
heritage that is “an integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity and a particularly 
important element in the history of peoples, nations and their relations with each other 
concerning their common heritage”.155 As one author puts it, “if the sunken vessel is private, 
then the treasure salvor has a greater chance of keeping everything recovered, perhaps worth 
millions. If the sunken vessel is public, then the sovereign retains ownership and the salvor is 
limited to reimbursement of his expenses”.156 In the Odyssey case, no reimbursement was 
envisaged. 
Can differential treatment for military sunken vessels be justified? Several 
considerations justify special treatment. Promotion of mutual respect among nations, comity 
of interest, national security, respect for maritime graves and, in particular, war cemeteries, 
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are just some of the reasons that would demand such special treatment. Whether there exists a 
customary norm in this regard it is still debated. However, opinio juris and State practice are 
gradually coalescing in this sense. Will the special status of military sunken vessels 
discourage salvors? Will it encourage further opacity and unlawful excavation? At the time of 
this writing, Odyssey and Peru are appealing to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit from the final order of dismissal and the final judgment.157 It is still too early 
to foresee the outcome of the case. Does the case have the potential for reaching the US 
Supreme Court? This seems doubtful as there seems to be a uniform trend towards an 
increased protection of military sunken vessels at both the national and international levels. 
Therefore, the rule of law seems clearly stated, and the decision, if confirmed, does not seem 
to have departed “from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings”. 158 
Furthermore, the US Supreme Court has rarely granted certiorari, i.e. agreed to hear maritime 
law cases.159 
Whatever the result of the case, the Black swan case – whereby private actors release 
minimal information about the project, until after the excavation has been completed – raises 
important ethical issues. The comparative advantage of the salvor is two-fold. “First, because 
the sovereign’s interest is subject to the vessel’s origin and identity, the salvor can exercise 
control over the vessel for the time being, while the sovereign, as a potential owner, can only 
speculate on the validity of its claims […]”. 160  Second, “the nature of salvage law in 
permitting salvage awards while ownership remains inconclusive encourages the salvor to 
focus its efforts on salvage rather than on efforts to identify the vessel […]”.161 
An eminent author once affirmed that “admiralty courts […] provide an alternative to 
lawlessness on the frontier of underwater cultural heritage and thereby fill a void”,162 and that 
“admiralty courts are justice-administering institutions in a cosmopolitan sense and not 
simply bodies for implementing local policies”.163 Issues of international comity may make 
these courts impartial and high-profiled. However, issues of extra-territoriality arise. 
Furthermore, salvage law has not yet developed procedural and substantive guarantees to 
adequately protect underwater cultural heritage. Dealing with claims filed by individuals, 
admiralty courts have applied salvage law to an overwhelming number of cases concerning 
underwater cultural heritage. However, these courts have rarely questioned whether salvage 
law is appropriate at all for historic shipwrecks. Only in recent cases, has attention been paid 
to deep water archaeological methodology.164 In this context, while some authors criticize 
admiralty law as allowing “freedom of fishing” or “first-come first-served approach”,165 
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others underline the recent developments in admiralty law as a promising pattern.166 It is 
worth considering that other fora are available albeit at the inter-State level.167 In this context, 
military sunken vessels involve issues of ownership and State immunity. With regard to the 
ownership of underwater cultural heritage, the CPUCH does not address this issue. Therefore, 
the regime established by the UNCLOS, which is deemed to reflect customary international 
law, still generally applies. UNCLOS, however, provides only general principles for 
establishing the ownership of the vessel and the objective of preserving archaeological and 
historical objects for the benefit of mankind. It is unclear whether UNCLOS provisions 
concerning military vessels can be applied to sunken warships. In this sense, the CPUCH 
contains special provisions for the recovery of such warships. Maritime powers insist on a 
rule that would require the consent of the flag State even in territorial waters. It remains to be 
seen whether this firm and uniform approach may determine the crystallization of a norm of 
customary law. 
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